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Introduction 
Developed countries undertake almost two-thirds (65.4%)
of today’s outward foreign direct investment (“outward 
FDI”)  (UNCTAD).  Developing  countries  account  for
a minor, but growing, share of outward FDI. Of those 
developing  countries,  China’s  size  and  ￿  nancial  re- 
sources have positioned it to drive the changing alloca-
tion of outward FDI in the future. China has a relatively 
short  history  as  a  contributor  to  outward  FDI;  until 
2003, outward foreign investment in China was practi-
cally non-existent. However China’s outward FDI has 
increased  more  than  2000%  since  2003,  from  2,855 
billion  USD  in  2003  to  84,220  billion  USD  in  2012 
(UNCTAD).  Much  of  this  occurred  during  the  ￿  nan-
cial crisis in 2008-09, when global outward FDI ￿  ow 
decreased  by  about  40%  (UNCTAD).  Chinese  ￿  rms 
bucked that trend, seizing the opportunity to increase 
their outward FDI signi￿  cantly. Chinese direct invest-
ment  compensated  for  the  missing  investments  from 
traditional sources, and troubled companies in Europe 
welcomed the in￿  ux of Chinese outward FDI. Despite 
this  enormous  increase  in  outward  FDI,  China  still 
receives more inward FDI than its outward FDI contri-
bution, giving it a net FDI importer status. 
In our study, we analyze Chinese FDI in Switzerland. 
We discuss the motives for Chinese ￿  rms to expand into 
Switzerland, as opposed to other destinations for Chinese 
outward FDI. We also investigate the dif￿  culties Chinese 
￿  rms face in Switzerland. Especially, we sought to shed 
light on the importance of professional networks and 
other soft factors for a successful integration process. To 
our knowledge this has not been investigated yet. Even 
though the study focuses on Switzerland, it also allows us 
to draw some conclusions regarding Chinese companies 
entering Central and Eastern European countries.
In our paper, we ￿  rst present the theoretical background. 
The  research  questions  and  design  follow.  Then  we 
present  the  empirical  results  and  conclude  with  an 
outlook. 
Theoretical Background
In the early years of China’s status as a destination for 
inward FDI, foreign ￿  rms had to learn how to operate 
within the framework of Chinese politics, culture, and 
expectations. Now, Chinese ￿  rms must adapt in order to 
thrive overseas. We believe that several key differences 
create a commercial as well as psychological barrier to 
ef￿  cient operation outside of China’s borders. Despite 
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the development of the market system, China remains 
a “political economy” (Child and Tse, 2001) characterized 
by active governmental involvement in business through 
ownership and regulation. However, in negotiations with 
the government, it is the use of personal relationships 
and unof￿  cial networks that empower Chinese ￿  rms to 
reach their goals. This contrasts with northern European 
expectations of free and accurate information, a strong 
rule  of  law,  and  separate  networks  for  personal  and 
professional  relationships.  Chinese  ￿  rms  that  operate 
over- seas but fail to understand the expectations of the 
host  county  create  unnecessary  dif￿  culties  for  them-
selves.
In the following paragraphs, we discuss the internatio-
nalization  of  Chinese  ￿  rms  using  a  few  selected 
models. The Uppsala model to start with is an early, 
well-known  internationalization  model  that  explains 
the  characteristics  of  the  internationalization  process 
as  a  gradual  process  of  four  stages:  1)  no  export; 
2) export through independent representatives; 3) sales 
subsidiary;  and,  4)  production  abroad  (Johanson  and 
Vahlne, 1977). According to the early Uppsala model, 
￿  rms should strengthen their domestic market position 
and  then  start  foreign  operations  with  “short  psychic 
distance”  (i.e.,  minimal  differences  in  language,  edu-
cation, culture, business practices and levels of industrial 
development). Firms that develop along this path will 
continuously  increase  their  market  knowledge  and 
their  general  experience  in  trans-border  activities, 
preparing for the next stage of expansion. In this model, 
the  internationalization  is  a  dynamic  learning process 
(Johanson and Vahlne, 1977). 
The early Uppsala model can explain some elements of 
the internationalization process of Chinese companies. 
Indeed,  much  of  China’s  outward  foreign  direct 
investment takes place in Hong Kong, Southeast Asia 
or in other areas only a short psychic distance away. 
But we have also found that some Chinese companies 
skip some stages of the early Uppsala model by directly 
establishing subsidiaries in countries with larger psychic 
distances, including Switzerland. 
Scholars  have  also  addressed  the  importance  of  soft 
factors in international expansion. A number of studies 
demonstrated the relevance of networks in the interna-
tionalization process (Coviello and Munro, 1997; Welch 
and Welch, 1996). The network model by Johanson and 
Mattson (1988) emphases the importance of a business 
network  for  internationalization. The  model  discusses 
the importance of the ￿  rm’s own business network and 
the  relevant  network  in  the  foreign  market.  Having 
a  good  business  network  but  no  relevant  position  in 
the foreign market network makes it more dif￿  cult to 
develop business. Both a business network and a foreign 
market network are necessary conditions for successful 
internationalization.  Chinese  companies,  being 
late-coming enterprises, often have no relevant position 
in the foreign market network. As outsiders, the lack of 
such market-speci￿  c business knowledge retards their 
internationalization.
Luo and Tung (2007) developed the emerging market 
springboard  model.  This  model  describes  ￿  rms  that 
systematically use international expansion as a spring-
board  for  acquiring  valuable  resources  and  assets, 
ultimately  boosting  the  international  positioning  of 
emerging  market  companies.  Through  these  “spring-
boards” Chinese companies will be able to overcome 
their competitive disadvantages, to bypass stringent trade 
barriers, to overcome domestic institutional constraints 
and ￿  nally to become strong international competitors. 
The springboard model explains several elements of the 
Chinese internationalization process. Through access to 
advanced technologies and speci￿  c industrial knowledge 
Chinese companies can compensate for their competitive 
disadvantages.  Acquiring  well-known  foreign  brands 
will strengthen their position in the home market and 
also give them the needed recognition in the international 
markets.  Recognizing  this,  many  Chinese  companies 
maintain  a  longer-term  strategic  view  and  organize 
overseas  operations  systematically.  The  springboard 
perspective explains some elements of Chinese MNEs as 
well as some behavior of Chinese companies located in 
Western and Eastern Europe. It can be noted that Chinese 
companies tend to locate high-tech manufacturing and 
knowledge-intense  services  in  Western  Europe  with 
M&A  as  a  preferred  market  entry  strategy.  Low-tech 
manufacturing  and  less  knowledge-intensive  services 
on the other hand are mostly established in Central or 
Eastern  European  countries  such  as  Russia,  Hungary 
or  Romania.  The  springboard  model,  however,  may 
require further development and validation to ￿  t small 
and mid-sized Chinese companies that are entering the 
global market in a second wave of internationalization. 
Research Questions and Research Design 
The research questions of this study can be described as 
follows: Why do Chinese companies choose to locate in 
Switzerland? What are their dif￿  culties? How important 
are their networks in this process? What are the cultural 
challenges? What conclusions can be drawn for other 
countries?
The information about Chinese companies in Switzerland 
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interviews by a native Chinese citizen, although a few 
were done on the phone. A pre-formulated questionnaire 
led the interviewer, who tailored his follow-up questions 
to the interviewee. We believe the personal interviews 
were the best option for gathering useful information 
because Chinese people are culturally hesitant to divulge 
critical  or  negative  information,  requiring  personal 
involvement by the interviewer. 
In total 20 Chinese companies located in Switzerland 
were interviewed. The interviews were conducted with 
a  senior  member  of  management  or  with  the  CEO. 
We tried to interview both the European and Chinese 
managers. Documentation in the form of tape recording 
was rejected as many interviewees refused it. We took 
structured notes during the interview and a detailed report 
of each interview was written immediately afterwards. 
The questionnaire consists of 55 questions that can be 
divided  into  four  different  categories.  Part  1  covers 
questions about the ￿  rm’s general characteristics such 
as size or branch. Part 2 are questions about the process 
of establishing a company, whereas part 3 comprehends 
questions about running a business in Switzerland. Part 4 
contains questions related to intercultural challenges.  To 
our knowledge, this is the only study that investigates the 
establishment of Chinese companies and their integration 
process in Switzerland. 
Empirical Results
In this section our results are presented. First, we give 
an  overview  of  the  interviewed  companies  and  some 
important characteristics of them. Then we outline why 
Switzerland  is  a  preferred  location.  Later  we  discuss 
differences in personal and professional networks and 
other cultural factors that appear to have hampered these 
companies. 
Overview of the Interviewed Companies
Today there are 50 Chinese companies located in different 
cantons in Switzerland. In contrast to other countries, 
we do not ￿  nd a concentration in one region. The inter-
viewed companies differ in many aspects and are active 
in different industries. Table 1 gives an overview of the 
industries the 20 interviewed companies are in. 
We would like to stress four important shared charac-
teristics of the companies we interviewed. First, most 
of  the  interviewed  Chinese  companies  have  been  in 
Switzerland for a short period of time; 50% of them were 
established after 2008 and only two of them (10%) have 
been located in Switzerland for over 10 years. Second, 
the interviewed companies are small or medium-sized 
companies.  This  is  consistent  with  the  other  Chinese 
￿  rms operating in Switzerland; a single outlier with 500 
employees is by far the largest we surveyed. Third, the 
vast majority of the employees of Chinese companies in 
Switzerland are ethnically European: 94% of their staff is 
European and only 6% are Chinese. Finally, the Chinese 
government is a signi￿  cant force behind the investment 
process of Chinese companies. 
Table 1 Overview of the industries of the interviewed 
companies
Industry Number of companies
Manufacturing 3
Construction 1
Aviation 1
Tobacco 1
Trading 1
Consulting 1
Banking and Finance 1
Information Technology 1
Watches 4
Oil / Mineral 1
Solar Energy 3
Telecommunication 2
Source: Own survey
Switzerland is not yet a Preferred Location
The  Uppsala  model  (Johanson  and  Vahlne,  1977, 
2009)  states  that  success  in  the  domestic  market  is 
a precondition for foreign direct investment. The majority 
of the interviewed Chinese companies are in-line with 
this  statement;  60%  of  the  interviewed  enterprises 
self-reported being number one in China and 25% even 
reported being number one worldwide. This indicates 
Chinese companies in Switzerland are well-positioned 
in the domestic market. Domestic success gives them 
the ￿  nancial resources to enter new markets. Further, 
the Uppsala model (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977, 2009) 
assumes  a  gradual  internationalization  process  and 
demonstrates that a company usually starts its business 
in a region with smaller psychic distance. Thirty-￿  ve 
percent  of  the  interviewed  companies  started  their 
international expansion in a region with small psychic 
distance like Hong Kong or South East Asia. Sixty percent 
of the companies, however, did their initial foreign direct 
investment in a European country, with four companies 
(20%) choosing Switzerland as their ￿  rst foreign station. 
Why  have  60%  of  the  companies  deviated  from  the 
gradual expansion path described in the Uppsala model, CENTRAL EUROPEAN BUSINESS REVIEW     RESEARCH PAPERS  VOLUME 3,  NUMBER 3,  SEPTEMBER 2014
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instead using the so-called springboard strategies (Luo 
and Tung, 2007) to move directly to a more challenging 
place like Europe? 
Before  answering  this  question  we  discuss  the  main 
reasons  for  Chinese  outward  FDI. As  in  many  other 
countries,  the  increased  competition  in  the  domestic 
market urges Chinese companies to look for new markets. 
Generally market access is one of the most acknowledged 
motivators  of  FDI.  Larger  market  size  and  a  higher 
economic growth rate lead to more incoming FDI (Kang 
and Jiang, 2010) and Chinese FDI to developed hosts 
is driven by market size and GDP (Kolstad and Wiig, 
2012). The reasons for Chinese companies to invest in 
foreign countries are resource seeking, natural resources, 
geographic growth, market seeking and diversi￿  cation, 
strategic  asset  seeking,  global  pro￿  le  building  and 
reputation (Buckley et al., 2007; Deng, 2004; Globerman 
and  Shapiro,  2002;  Kolstad  and  Wiig,  2012;  KPMG, 
2010; Seth and Yaprak, 2012). Seventy percent of the 
interviewed  Chinese  ￿  rms  report  that  they  came  to 
Switzerland  for  skilled  labor.  Forty  percent  reported 
the “Switzerland” brand was an important factor; 35% 
found the geographical location important, with another 
35% reporting political stability as an important reason. 
Proximity to customers was important for another 30% 
of the ￿  rms. Another 30% of the companies report that 
low  taxes  are  essential.  For  70%  another  individual 
and speci￿  c factor is crucial. The reasons to locate in 
Switzerland are illustrated in Figure 1.
We  expected  to  ￿  nd  that  Swiss  branding  was  a  key 
motive  for  locating  in  Switzerland.  The  Swiss  brand 
stands  for  quality  and  advanced  technology  which  is 
highly valued in China, and many Chinese companies 
reported they want to use the label “Swiss Made.” This is 
consistent with the springboard model, in which Chinese 
companies internationalize in order to seek assets or use 
internationalization as a springboard to overcome their 
latecomer disadvantage in the global competition (Luo 
and Tung, 2007). They realized that competing on low 
cost is not enough but an improvement in their skills, 
knowledge and product quality is essential. The spring-
board  behavior  often  involves  a  series  of  aggressive, 
risk-taking behavior such as buying critical assets from 
mature multinational companies (Luo and Tung, 2007). 
The reasons to locate a subsidiary in Switzerland are 
linked to the functions the subsidiary will take over in 
Switzerland. Figure 2 con￿  rms that Chinese companies 
in Switzerland seek access to foreign markets; 85% of 
the subsidiaries functioned as sales of￿  ces and 65% of 
the subsidiaries provided customer service. This focus on 
Good banking system
Free capital transfer
Good infrastructure
Close to customers
Low taxes
Central location in Europe
Political stability
Swiss made, Swiss brand & Swiss…
Skilled labour
Others
10%
15%
20%
30%
30%
35%
35%
40%
70%
70%
Figure 1 Reasons to locate a subsidiary in Switzerland
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the establishment and development of their sales channel 
also indicates that many of the Chinese companies are in 
the early stages of internationalization according to the 
Uppsala model. 
Thirty-￿  ve percent of the companies maintain research 
and  development  capabilities  in  Switzerland.  Of  the 
interviewed ￿  rms, only 35% also maintained a global or 
regional headquarters in Switzerland. For those compa-
nies, low corporate taxes were one of the main factors 
driving their location choice (Becker, Fuest and Riedel, 
2012). The tax advantage of Switzerland in comparison 
to other European countries is often unknown by many 
Chinese entrepreneurs. 
Switzerland is valued as a good place to get access to new 
technology  and  to  research  and  development.  Human 
capital  is  one  of  the  major  factors  Switzerland  can 
offer (World Economic Forum, 2011). Production and 
procurement play an important role for some industries 
but not for the majority. 
Figure 2 also explains why the proportion of Chinese 
companies  in  Switzerland  is  small  relative  to  other 
European  countries  such  as  Germany.  The  obvious 
disadvantage of Switzerland is the small domestic market. 
Chinese companies highly value a large domestic market 
– probably even overestimate it. This is not surprising 
as  many  Chinese  companies  grew  rapidly  and  made 
money through their own large domestic market. Often 
the management is not fully aware that they can access 
the  whole  European  market  through  Switzerland.  For 
Central and Eastern European countries though, the focus 
of Chinese companies would be in the area of production 
and manufacturing. It is obvious that only 20% of the 
interviewed companies see Switzerland as a production 
location  due  to  high  labor  and  manufacturing  costs. 
As many Central and Eastern European countries have 
similar  low-cost  structures  like  China,  production  is 
thus preferably located in Central and Eastern European 
countries with BYD Electronics as one example, having 
recently established manufacturing facilities in Hungary 
and Romania. 
Private Network versus Professional Business 
Network
Cultural differences, which are often seen as a source of 
con￿  ict, have received substantial attention by scholars 
and practitioners. Numerous empirical studies showed that 
cultural and organizational differences contribute to poor 
performance (Schoenberg, 2004; Weber and Schweiger, 
1992; Weber, Shenkar and Raveh, 1996). Business culture 
is de￿  ned as the culture in which people do business and 
how they interact with each other while doing business. 
The concept of business culture includes norms, individual 
values  and  organizational  values,  working  language, 
symbols,  beliefs  and  working  habits  (Hofstede,  2001). 
Switzerland and China have business cultures that differ 
greatly. To solve dif￿  culties Swiss managers are used to 
seeking professional help from individuals with whom 
they  have  no  personal  relationship.  Chinese  culture  is 
famous for its collectivistic and network-oriented nature. 
To solve dif￿  culties Chinese managers tend to seek help 
within their network and are not used to venturing beyond 
it to obtain professional help. 
Procurement
Production
Research &
Development
(European) Headquarter
Customer service
Sales office
20%
20%
35%
35%
65%
85%
Figure 2 Functions of the Swiss subsidiary
Source: Own surveyCENTRAL EUROPEAN BUSINESS REVIEW     RESEARCH PAPERS  VOLUME 3,  NUMBER 3,  SEPTEMBER 2014
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Chinese  and  Swiss  ￿  rms  and  decision  makers  gather 
information differently. About 50% of the Chinese ￿  rms 
relied  on  internal  information,  via  information  from 
partner  companies  and  friends.  Thirty-￿  ve  percent  of 
the ￿  rms trusted information of the Chinese embassy 
in Bern and the Commercial and Trade Consulate. The 
local  governments  and  the  departments  of  economic 
promotion  were  contacted  by  35%  of  the  ￿  rms. 
Professional business consultants were only involved in 
30% of the cases. Although the Internet contains ample 
relevant information about investment conditions, only 
a minority of Chinese ￿  rms (15%) used websites like 
www.swissinfo.ch or www.s-ge.com (former osec.ch), 
even  though  they  are  available  in  Chinese.  Only  5% 
of the ￿  rms know about the Swiss promotional agency 
Switzerland  Global  Enterprise  (former  OSEC).  This 
result re￿  ects the fact that Chinese people tend to rely on 
information from friends and family in business issues 
more than Western ￿  rms do. 
The  differences  in  information  gathering  techniques 
do appear to put Chinese ￿  rms at a disadvantage. Figure 
3  lists  the  percentage  of  interviewed  companies  that 
wanted additional information on selected topics. Forty 
percent of the Chinese companies are not aware of the 
amount of social security contributions that have to be 
paid in Switzerland. 
This  result  is  surprising  to  us  because  much  of  this 
information can be easily found on the Internet for free in 
English, including the regulations for visas and working 
permission,  tax  system,  working  regulations,  social 
security  cost,  and  the  process  for  creating  a  business 
entity. This may be explained once again with the way 
Chinese people gather information (so-called Guanxi) 
and  their  dependence  on  private  networks.  A  few 
interviewed managers said that the of￿  cial information 
in China is only propaganda and has no real meaning. 
Chinese people are less willing to pay for professional 
information  and  consulting.  A  business  network  that 
is  effective  and  ef￿  cient  includes  relationships  to  all 
business  counterparties  including  clients,  delivery 
companies, distributors, competitors, lawyers, and local 
government and so on.
Cultural Differences and the Image of China 
Collaboration between  employees  is  essential  for  any 
company.  In  the  following  question  only  companies 
that  have  both  Chinese  and  European  employees  are 
analyzed  (16  companies).  Thirteen  percent  of  the 
interviewed  ￿  rms  report  a  harmonious  collaboration 
and 31% a neutral collaboration between Chinese and 
Swiss  employees.  In  those  ￿  rms,  the  employees  are 
often  well-educated  and  the  corporate  language  is 
On advertisment procedures
On the swiss culture & negotioation
techniques
On working conditions & social costs
On the foundation process of a company
On taxes
On raising capital
On visas & working permissions
15%
20%
25%
25%
25%
30%
35%
Figure 3  Percentage of companies wishing additional information on different topics
Source: Own surveyCENTRAL EUROPEAN BUSINESS REVIEW     RESEARCH PAPERS  VOLUME 3, NUMBER 3, SEPTEMBER  2014
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English. But 56% of the interviewed companies said that 
the collaboration between Chinese and Swiss employees 
is  dif￿  cult,  making  internal  collaboration  an  ongoing 
struggle. The Chinese view of teamwork is hierarchical 
and stresses following instructions by line management, in 
contrast to the more egalitarian and collegial model used in 
Western organizations. In addition, Chinese employees are 
dissatis￿  ed with the fact that many European employees 
separate professional and private life. For 25% this is not 
relevant as they have no Chinese employees. 
Social con￿  icts have the potential to disturb knowledge 
transfer and to lead to a failure of the acquisition process 
(Vaara et al., 2012). Cultural differences and the resulting 
social con￿  icts have to be taken seriously. One might think 
that the main problem behind this is language barriers; this 
is not the case. Language barriers were only in 19% of 
the cases a real problem as English is often the corporate 
language. Eighty-one percent of the Chinese companies 
in Switzerland see psychological and cultural differences 
as the main cause of the failure in cooperation. Different 
cultures  lead  to  different  working  and  management 
styles,  resulting  in  con￿  icts  throughout  every  level  of 
the  organization.  Forty-￿  ve  percent  of  the  interviewed 
companies report that they often suffer due to the bad 
image of China. Another 35% do so sometimes and 5% 
suffer seldom. Only 10% of the interviewed ￿  rms reported 
never suffering. Factors leading to the negative image of 
Chinese  companies  include  reports  about  violations  of 
human rights, piracy and violations of intellectual property 
laws, and early outward FDI from China to Africa or Asia 
(Kolstad and Wiig, 2012). 
It  is  clear  that  from  the  moment  a  ￿  rm  enters  a  host 
country, they must meet corporate and social expectations 
and demonstrate corporate social responsibility. This will 
allow them to build social legitimacy in the host country. 
The larger the cultural distance between the country of 
origin and host country, the more dif￿  cult it will be to attain 
this social legitimacy. It is exactly this social legitimacy 
that Chinese companies in Switzerland seek but also are 
struggling with. Regarding cultural differences, the gap is 
supposed to be smaller between Chinese and Central and 
Eastern European companies due to a common history 
and a cultural heritage with high power distance as well 
as  high  family  and  group  collectivism.  Those  similar 
cultural practices and orientations are in favor of Central 
and Eastern European countries when welcoming Chinese 
companies in their domestic market.
Conclusion and Managerial Implications
In conclusion, Chinese companies have little experience 
in  leading  enterprises  abroad  and  therefore  make 
beginners’ mistakes. They are often disadvantaged when 
entering into foreign markets, and only a few Chinese 
brands have achieved worldwide recognition. Most of 
the Chinese companies in Switzerland are doing business 
in a Chinese way. Instead of establishing an extensive 
business network they continue to rely mainly on their 
private network. Rather than making use of professional 
services  such  as  consulting,  they  prefer  to  learn  by 
trial and error. This behavior often leads to suboptimal 
decisions and increases the cost of the internationalization 
process. Cooperation between employees is essential for 
the integration process and business development. The 
existing intercultural dif￿  culties need to be addressed 
and  overcome.  Intercultural  training  would  help  to 
reduce  this  problem.  The  main  motivations  to  settle 
down in Switzerland are brand building, access to the 
label  “Switzerland”  and  strategic  assets.  Some  other 
signi￿  cant advantages of Switzerland, such as an ef￿  cient 
tax system and a good banking system, are unknown 
and underestimated among Chinese companies. This is 
attributable to their lack of international experience and 
lower degree of internationalization. The recently signed 
free  trade  agreement  between  China  and  Switzerland 
opens  new  perspectives  for  both  sides. We  anticipate 
that more Chinese companies will invest in Switzerland 
and the two countries will be linked more closely. With 
the increasing interaction of both countries their mutual 
understanding will be improved. 
It  can  be  assumed  that  Chinese  companies  apply 
similar  motivations,  practices  and  behaviors  when 
internationalizing towards Central and Eastern Europe. 
When  looking  at  Europe,  Chinese  companies  tend  to 
see the European market as an entity, not being aware of 
economic, political and cultural differences. Due to given 
experiences, Central and Eastern European countries are 
preferably chosen as manufacturing locations. Hereby 
the comparative cost advantage is a main motivational 
driver for Chinese companies to locate, but still needs 
to  be  promoted  more  intensively.  Similarly  as  in 
Switzerland, the of￿  cial economic promotion agencies 
can increase their impact on attracting Chinese OFDI. 
Business practices and behaviors of Chinese managers 
can be assumed to be the same when expanding towards 
Central and Eastern Europe. As mentioned above, the 
cultural differences might be on a smaller scale, but will 
also need to be reconciled for successful and long-term 
business relationships.   
Until now most research related to Chinese companies’ 
targets  top  listed  MNE.  In  this  study,  we  focused  on 
Chinese  SMEs  in  Switzerland.  Further  research  will 
investigate  the  general  internationalization  level  of CENTRAL EUROPEAN BUSINESS REVIEW     RESEARCH PAPERS  VOLUME 3,  NUMBER 3,  SEPTEMBER 2014
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Chinese companies and their decision making process. 
A research focus hereby should be given on the inter-
nationalization  strategies  and  processes  of  Chinese 
SMEs originating from the private sector.
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